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‘Political imagination, in its most fervid and 
patriotic flights’: Copyright and Constitutional
Theory in Post-Confederation Canada
BRADLEy MILLER
Abstract
This article is about differing ideas of self-government in post-Confederation
Canada. It looks in particular at how the issue of copyright exposes a provoca-
tive and little-understood strain of constitutional theory in the first few decades
of Confederation. This theory contended that the British North America Act
was far more than a division of powers within a still-subordinate colony of the
empire. Instead, proponents of the theory argued that the act was a constitu-
tional turning point which transferred a share of British sovereignty to Canada,
and gave the dominion new power even to contravene imperial law. This the-
ory found support among many prominent politicians, judges, lawyers, and
scholars. Armed with this idea, the federal Parliament passed a bill in 1872
that would have overridden imperial copyright. But neither the bill nor the the-
ory succeeded. Britain blocked the legislation and an emerging consensus
among constitutional thinkers, lawyers, and judges rejected its theoretical
underpinnings. By exploring the debate over the limits of Canada’s power, this
paper points to the diversity of ideas that surrounded even the basic precepts of
the constitutional order after 1867. 
Résumé
Cet article porte sur les notions divergentes d’autonomie gouvernementale
dans le Canada d’après la confédération.  Il s’intéresse notamment à la façon
dont la question du droit d’auteur révèle un aspect controversé et mal compris
de la théorie constitutionnelle dans les premières décennies de la confédéra-
tion.  Selon cette théorie, l’enjeu de l’Acte de l’Amérique du Nord britannique
dépassait la simple répartition des compétences dans une colonie encore
secon daire au sein de l’empire.  Les tenants de la théorie ont plutôt fait valoir
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que cette loi marque un moment charnière de l’histoire constitutionnelle, au
sens où elle  a transféré une part de souveraineté britannique au Canada et
conféré de nouveaux pouvoirs au dominion, qui l’autorisaient même à con-
trevenir au droit impérial.  De nombreux politiciens, juges, avocats et
intellectuels en vue ont appuyé cette théorie.  En 1872, armé de cette idée, le
parlement fédéral a adopté un projet de loi proposant de passer outre à la loi
impériale sur le droit d’auteur.  Mais ni le projet de loi ni la théorie ne devaient
connaître de lendemain, la Grande-Bretagne bloquant la proposition et un con-
sensus se dégageant parmi les avocats, juges et têtes pensantes de la
constitution pour rejeter ses fondements théoriques.  Cet article, en analysant
le débat sur les limites des pouvoirs du Canada, fait ressortir la diversité
d’idées entourant même les préceptes fondamentaux de l’ordre constitutionnel
d’après 1867.
Introduction 
What was the foundation of Canadian self-government after 1867? Was itpolitical only, in the sense of being allowed by British law and custom,
but entirely subject to them as well? Or had the British north America Act
(BnA Act) been a turning point, giving the new dominion an equal status with
the mother country and a share of British sovereignty? Had it actually
entrenched Canadian liberty? in the first two decades of confederation these
questions sparked serious debate in Canada. even among legal literates —
those with a sophisticated knowledge of the law, trained lawyers or not — there
was disagreement about this basic precept of the constitutional order.1
Few issues went so directly to the core of this debate as copyright. As the
copyright controversy dragged on for decades, it continually evoked questions
about the limits of Canadian self-government. Successive generations of
Canadian policy-makers and businessmen campaigned for reform to the
Canadian and imperial systems and their policy proposals often entailed disen-
tangling Canada from British laws and, after 1886, from the multilateral Berne
Convention. not surprisingly, they usually found a critical audience in the
imperial government. But the debate over copyright was even more heated
because these proposals also embodied a provocative vision about the scope of
Canadian power and about the meaning of the 1867 constitution. As a result,
the debate over copyright was embroiled in a much larger discussion about
Canada’s legal stature in the empire. 
Copyright reformers were not alone in offering an unconventional vision
of the imperial connection. After 1867, this line of thinking was espoused by
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1 the term “legal literates” is borrowed from Mary Sarah Bilder, “the Lost Lawyers: early
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Humanities 11 (1999): 47–117. 
some major judges, lawyers, scholars, and government officials. they con-
tended that the BnA Act was far more than an imperial statute laying out a
federal constitution. For them, it was in fact a grant of sovereignty, a permanent
abdication of British constitutional authority over the powers given to the fed-
eral parliament. this constitutional vision fuelled the 1872 copyright bill, and
in adopting this theory and embodying it in this bill, the Canadian government
embraced a vision of the imperial connection that went far beyond the idea of
political autonomy and became one of constitutional liberty. 
However, neither the bill nor the theory underpinning it succeeded. the bill
was blocked by the imperial authorities and the constitutional theory was
rejected both by the British government and by most constitutional thinkers in
Canada. As a result, this paper is about legislative and ideological false-starts,
examples of creative statecraft (however dubious) which were stifled in the
early post-confederation period. By necessity it focuses on legal specifics, since
the concepts of Canadian freedom explored here do not involve the usual hall-
marks of independence. Canada was not dissolving the monarchy or declaring
war. Rather, the concepts of liberty debated in the post-confederation period
centre on the federal government’s power to modify or repeal imperial law, and
the arguments in favour of such power largely stemmed from a certain legal
construction of a particular section of the BnA Act. As a result, understanding
this climate of experimentation and appreciating how provocative the Canadian
proposals were means wading to some extent into the technicalities of the law.
But having done so we can more fully appreciate the diversity of ideas that sur-
rounded the constitutional order after 1867, and see how these ideas affected
the practice of Canadian politics. 
that such disagreement existed should not in one sense be surprising, since
Canadian historians have long focused on the heated federal-provincial debates
over federalism.2 this work has illustrated major cleavages in understanding the
BnA Act between parties, ideologies, languages, and regions.3 in fact, we have
been pushed to ask if there could ever have been a coherent vision of the consti-
tution emerging from the confederation conferences. But in another sense, that
even legal experts disagreed on the nature of the imperial connection is surpris-
ing. After all, there simply was no straightforward answer for what should happen
when the federal power over trade and commerce clashed with the provincial
87
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3 See A.i. Silver, The French-Canadian Idea of Confederation 2nd ed. (toronto: University of
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power on property and civil rights, to use a well-worn example. By contrast,
Canada was simply and manifestly still a member of the British empire, and that
there was disagreement even on so foundational a point reinforces the argument
made by the legal scholar R.C.B. Risk, that in the first few years of confederation
even the core tenets of the constitution were up for grabs.4
in examining these issues, this paper proceeds in four main parts. First it
outlines the nature of the copyright conflict. Almost immediately after confed-
eration the issue became a top and pressing political matter, and Canadian
officials and representatives of the book trade lobbied for changes to the impe-
rial copyright system, but were rebuffed. Second, it discusses the influence of
constitutional theory on the 1872 copyright bill. third, it examines this theory
of Canadian power in the jurisprudence and constitutional writing of the post-
confederation period, in which this vision of the BnA Act had supporters
among prominent members of the legal community. Finally, this paper exam-
ines responses to this theory, both by Canadian judges and scholars and by
imperial officials, illustrating the formation of a consensus in which this idea
was decisively rejected. 
Copyright and the Movement for Reform 
the historical literature on Canadian copyright is growing rapidly. Scholars in
Canada such as George parker, Meera nair, Sara Bannerman, and Myra tawfik
have illustrated very well how deep are the roots of the present global battles
over copyright. their work also makes plain that the political and legal ques-
tions at play, coupled with the amount of money involved in the publishing
industry and the degree of pressure coming from Canadian business, consis-
tently made copyright a top issue in Canada for decades.5 its importance also
went well beyond the issue of books, posing crucial questions about Canada’s
place in the empire and wider world: how much could Britain intervene in
88
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Blaine Baker and Jim phillips (toronto: University of toronto press, 2006), 50–1. 
5 Meera nair, “the Copyright Act of 1889: A Canadian Declaration of independence,”
Canadian Historical Review 90, no. 1 (March 2009): 1–28; also Meera nair, “From Fair
Dealing to Fair Duty: the necessary Margins of Canadian Copyright Law.” (ph.D. diss.,
Simon Fraser University, 2009); Sara Bannerman, “Canada and the Berne Convention,
1886–1971.” (ph.D. diss., Carleton University, 2009); Myra tawfik, “For the encouragement
of Learning: the Origins of Canadian Copyright Law, 1824–1842,” paper presented at the
toronto Legal History Group, February 2009; Myra tawfik, “A Connecticut yankee in
Montreal: Mark twain’s Adventure with Canadian Copyright Law,” paper presented at the
toronto Legal History Group, December 2006; George parker, “english-Canadian publishers
and the Struggle for Copyright,” in History of the Book in Canada, Vol. 2, eds., yvan
Lamonde, patricia Lockhart Fleming, and Fiona A. Black (toronto: University of toronto
press, 2005), 148–58. For older work, see R.A. Shields, “imperial policy and the Canadian
Canadian affairs? How did the imperial government go about supervising the
legislation of its established dominions? What role did international influences
play in Canadian and imperial policy-making? On the question of imperial and
international affairs, the work of British scholars such as Catherine Seville
helps remind us that copyright was an international issue affected by British
law, international trade policy, and the emerging international legal regime of
copyright that developed in the nineteenth century, first through bilateral
treaties and agreements and then through the multilateral Berne Convention.6
in order to understand the constitutional questions embedded in the copy-
right debate, it is necessary to understand the premises of that debate. Since this
was (and is) an exceptionally complex area of law, what follows is a very sim-
plified sketch of the aspects of copyright which caused the most controversy in
Canada, namely foreign reprints of British copyrighted works and what we will
call imperial copyright — that is, copyright that spanned the British empire,
giving a work protection not just in Canada but also in Britain, Australia, South
Africa, and so on. First, the reprints issue: in 1842 Britain banned the importa-
tion of foreign reprints of British copyrighted works at home and in the
empire.7 this was an unpopular move in many colonies, and especially so in
British north America where cheap American reprints of British books were a
mainstay of the reading public.8 Many claimed that British editions were too
expensive for the colonial market, and since the United States offered no pro-
tection to non-American authors, American publishers marketed cheap editions
north of the border. One Montréal newspaper said the new British policy would
“girdle the tree of knowledge in Canada, by shutting out the people from the
89
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only available supplies of books.”9 Due to the mounting colonial pressure,
Britain passed the Foreign Reprints Act in 1847, which suspended the ban on
importing these reprints where a colony imposed and collected a duty on them
and remitted that money to the imperial government for the copyright hold-
ers.10 While imports were allowed, however, Canadian firms could not reprint
those same books in the colony, which gave American publishers an almost
uncontested dominance of the British north American market.11 this system
was still in place at the time of confederation.12
the other issue was the question of how Canadian copyright intersected
with imperial copyright. in Canada, during this period, there were two copy-
rights — one could be obtained through printing, publishing, and registering
under the Canadian copyright act. this was a territorially-defined copyright,
and gave a work no protection outside of Canada. the other could be obtained
under the imperial copyright act by publishing in the United kingdom. this
system was bolstered in 1868 when the House of Lords affirmed the rule that
imperial copyright was only available under the imperial act, and that Canadian
copyright meant nothing in england, or Australia, or South Africa, while British
copyright applied everywhere in the empire.13
this copyright regime was very problematic for Canada. Obviously, the
Canadian government would have preferred if more people took out Canadian
copyright since it made work for typesetters, printers, paper manufacturers,
and others. not surprisingly, then, the fact that anyone could secure protection
in Canada without printing or publishing in the country and without comply-
ing with Canadian law was increasingly irksome for policymakers. the other
major problems centred on the reprints issue. First, the scheme to collect the
import duty did not work, for various reasons; everyone seemed to agree on
this. An 1878 British Royal Commission found that in the entire decade pre-
vious the nineteen colonies which participated in the reprint scheme remitted
only about £1,100 in total.14 the commission called it a “complete failure”
and the Canadian Finance Minister in 1869 said the money collected was “a
mere trifle.”15 On top of the collection system not working, which rankled the
British government and certainly the British copyright holders, Canadians
90
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9 Montreal Witness (December 1845), as quoted in J.L. Morison, British Supremacy &
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11 Foreign Reprints Act, 1847 [Uk], 10 & 11 Vic., cap. 95. 
12 See the Canadian Copyright Act, 1868, 31 Vic., cap. 54; also, the act imposing a duty on for-
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13 Routledge v. Low, House of Lords Reports, vol. 3, 120. 
14 Report of the Royal Commission on Copyright, Parliamentary Papers, 1878 [Uk], Vol. xxiV,
C, 2036, xxxi. 
15 “Copyright Commission,” xxxi; Memorandum of Sir John Rose to Colonial Office, 30 June
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increasingly found the system unfair. After all, in this system Canada could
import foreign reprints of British works, but Canadian printers and publishers
could not reprint those same works in Canada. And, coupled with the fact that
anyone could obtain copyright in Canada under the imperial act without print-
ing or publishing here, many in that industry felt they were decidedly
disadvantaged by British policy. As a result, reform became an increasingly
pressing political priority and a near-constant controversy in the wider sphere
of imperial relations. 
in the late 1860s, the publishing industry and the parliament of Canada
began pushing hard for Canadians to have the same right to reprint and sell
British copyrighted works as was given to foreigners under the 1847 arrange-
ment.16 in 1868, the Senate resolved to impress on the imperial government
“the justice and expediency” of extending reprint privileges to Canadians.17
One Montréal publisher who was lobbying the government told the finance
minister that “the people of the Dominion, and especially the printing and pub-
lishing interests, feel that they ought to possess at least equal privileges to those
conceded to the foreigner.”18 this kind of language — that the issue was one
of simple equality with foreigners — came up again and again in the debate
over reprints. in pamphlets and petitions, official correspondence, newspaper
editorials, and parliamentary debates, reform advocates continually stressed
that they only wanted to be on an “equal footing” or “the same footing” with
American firms. Given that right, they said, they could compete successfully in
the market with American editions. 
there was some support for this position in both the British government
and the British literary world. there were authors and copyright holders who
thought that if the Canadians could come up with a scheme to license reprints
and extract a fee, and actually get them a royalty, it was worth deviating from
the ideals of monopoly copyright and literary property, in which the copyright
holder controlled when and where a book was reproduced.19 indeed, the
Canadian finance minister and a representative of the British copyright lobby
actually arrived at a joint proposal for such an arrangement in 1869.20 there
were also elements of the imperial government that were sympathetic to
Canada on this issue, and most imperial officials readily admitted that the impe-
91
16 For example, see petitions presented in parliament: Debates of the Senate of Canada, 5 May
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17 Resolution dated 15 May 1868, Sessional Papers, 1869, vol. 2, no. 11, 1. 
18 John Lovell to Sir John Rose, 11 June 1868, Sessional Papers, 1868, vol. 2, no. 11, 5. 
19 Sir Charles trevelyan to thomas Longman, 8 February 1872, Copyright Commission
Appendix, no. 1, 328; thomas Carlyle to trevelyan, 1 April 1872, ibid., 329; J.A. Froude to
trevelyan, 12 May 1872, ibid.; A.W. kinglake to trevelyan, 22 April 1872, ibid. 
20 “Copyright Commission evidence,” 2; “Colonial Copyright,” 71–2.
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rial copyright system (where copyright around the empire could be obtained by
registering in Britain only) was unfair to the colonies.21
But the more powerful opinion in London, both in government and the lit-
erary world, was against any compromise on this front. in March 1870, the new
British Copyright Association rejected the 1869 deal. the group included major
figures in the British literary world such as authors Charles Dickens and
Anthony trollope and publishers John Murray and thomas Longman. this
group declared that authors and copyright holders should not have to surrender
control over their work and they should not have to compromise with literary
pirates. “Such a forced surrender would be a private wrong and a public injury,”
they contended.22 not only did they resist a new licensing scheme for Canada,
but they began pushing for the repeal of the old Foreign Reprints Act of 1847,
the act which allowed Canadians to buy American reprints of British books.23
the imperial government took a similar stand against reprints, and for
much the same reason as the Copyright Association, namely the idea of literary
property. One of the major officials in the board of trade said that the 1847
Reprint Act was an exception to imperial policy, a deviation to quell colonial
unrest and not the basis for more legislation.24 He wrote that the “public policy
of the mother country enforces an absolute monopoly in works of literature.”25
nor was Britain acting in isolation, and the Board of trade expressed serious
concerns about the impact of Canada’s reprint proposals on Britain’s bilateral
copyright treaties. Another official there argued that colonial legislation based
on the 1847 act might cause Britain’s treaty partners, including France,
Belgium, and prussia, to simply pull out of the arrangements.26 yet another
official cast the issue in a similarly international context, noting that “the prin-
ciple of recognizing and protecting literary property has … become more and
more firmly established, day by day, in all civilized nations.”27 While this prin-
ciple had not yet crystallized into a multilateral convention, the movement for
literary property was gaining ground rapidly across europe. Framed in this con-
text, Canada was not simply deviating from imperial policy, but going
backwards on an issue of increasing international significance. 
in the end, the empire proved incapable of resolving the conflict between
these two viewpoints on reprinting. During this period, as long as British impe-
rial law applied in Canada and as long as Britain was unwilling to relinquish all
control over Canadian affairs in this respect, there was little chance of a reso-
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21 G. Shaw Lefevre to the Colonial Office, 27 July 1869, “Colonial Copyright,” 30. 
22 “Colonial Copyright,” 76–7. 
23 Longman and Murray to W.e. Gladstone, March 1870, “Colonial Copyright,” 46. 
24 Louis Mallet to Colonial Office, 22 July 1868, “Colonial Copyright,” 22. 
25 ibid. 
26 Lefevre to the Colonial Office, 27 July 1869, “Colonial Copyright,” 29. 
27 Farrer to Rose, 26 March 1872, Private Correspondence. 
lution. Given the pressures on the imperial government from both the colonies
and the British publishers, given the increasingly influential ideas of monopoly
copyright and the growing international treaty regime, there was no feasible
way to balance the licensing position and the literary property position. As a
result, the conflict dragged on, though as parker has noted, Canadian support
for reprinting diminished in the 1890s and the movement achieved little.28
Section 91 and the Copyright Question, 1872 
As Britain proved unresponsive to Canadian protests, a radical constitutional
theory became increasingly prominent in Canadian proposals for a reprint
scheme. this was the idea that granting the reprint privilege was not simply the
right thing to do, but that Canada actually had the constitutional freedom from
Britain sufficient to do this itself, because copyright was one of the powers
bestowed on Ottawa in the BnA Act. Most scholars of copyright, and histori-
ans of the imperial relationship such as David M.L. Farr, have noted this idea,
but it remains little understood.29 this section explores the influence of this the-
ory on the 1872 copyright bill. 
the idea that Canada could legislate in direct defiance of imperial law
stemmed from the preamble to section 91 of the BnA Act, the main federal
powers section. the preamble reads in part that “the exclusive Legislative
Authority of the parliament of Canada extends to all Matters coming within the
Classes of Subjects next hereinafter enumerated.”30 While most readers have
always assumed that the word “exclusive” was used to distinguish federal from
provincial powers, many in this period argued that it actually signified the
exclusion of the imperial parliament — that the British government had per-
manently bound its own hands, divided its sovereignty, and abdicated its
authority over the issues listed in section 91. in this vision, then, Britain had not
simply created a new colonial legislature through the BnA Act, but had instead
crafted an equivalent institution to itself, another partner in British sovereignty.
As a result, i will refer to this idea as “exclusivist theory,” after the idea of
exclusive powers under section 91.31
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30 BnA Act [Uk],30 & 31 Vic., cap. 3, sec. 91. 
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this theory ultimately fuelled the Canadian copyright bill of 1872. the bill
would have allowed Canadian firms to purchase a license from the government
to reprint British works without the copyright holder’s permission if they were
not reprinted and republished in Canada within a month of publication in
Britain.32 this was obviously in direct conflict with the 1842 and 1847 imper-
ial laws, since it would end the protection given by British copyright in Canada,
but the bill’s preamble explained its justification. it reiterated the ideas that
reprinting would more effectually remunerate British authors and that
Canadians should have the same rights as foreigners to reprint books. However,
it also alluded to this theory about what the BnA Act meant for Canadian power
vis-á-vis the empire, declaring that “express power is given to the parliament of
Canada to legislate upon the subject of copyright,” by the BnA Act.33 in this
view, the section 91 power went far beyond separating federal from provincial
responsibilities. 
exclusivist theory was clearly espoused in the Senate, where the bill was
introduced. A few weeks previously, Senator J.S. Sanborn, a lawyer who very
soon became a Québec superior court and then appeal court judge, argued as he
and others had before, that “full liberty has been conceded to us by the imperial
Government” in the BnA Act and that the “spirit of our constitution gives us
the power of acting” to implement a reprint arrangement.34 A few weeks later
when the government leader in the senate — lawyer and future Justice Minister
Alexander Campbell — indeed introduced the reprints bill, he referenced
Sanborn’s opinion. Campbell said he had consulted with the justice minister
(who was also the prime minister, Sir John A. Macdonald) and they had decided
to bring a bill forward on that premise. Campbell also referred to the section 91
preamble, saying that while some might see it only as a division of powers with
the provinces, he believed “the language was broad enough to embrace the
power given in the present bill.”35
there was disagreement about this idea from the start. Jacques-Olivier
Bureau, for example, argued that Canada lacked the power to pass a statute
which was, as he put it, “in the face” of imperial law.36 He told the Senate that
“we could not be too careful in dealing with matters of legislation, where we
might come into conflict with imperial authorities.”37 Certainly, the govern-
ment knew the bill would be scrutinized heavily in London on these grounds.
Campbell noted that it would only come into force with imperial permission,
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32 Copyright Bill, 1872, “Colonial Copyright Correspondence [1875],” parliamentary papers,
1875, Vol. Li, no. 144, 5–6. 
33 ibid., 6. 
34 Senate Debates, 8 May 1872, 427. 
35 ibid., 4 June 1872, 966. 
36 ibid., 5 June 1872, 993. 
37 ibid., 4 June 1872, 967. 
but he hoped that the imperial law officers charged with reviewing colonial leg-
islation would agree with the government’s opinion on the constitutional
question.38 nor was imperial review unusual in such circumstances. After con-
federation, the British government continued to examine Canadian legislation,
and until 1878 the governor-general’s royal instructions even specified a list of
legislative topics on which royal assent should be reserved automatically.39 in
fact, the copyright bill met two of these criteria: it related to obligations under
imperial treaties (as Britain then had at least four copyright treaties) and
affected the rights of British subjects outside Canada.40 As a result, while the
bill embodied a theory which arguably re-shaped the nature of the imperial con-
nection, it would be debated within a continuing matrix of British power. 
Exclusivist Theory and Constitutional Thought 
this expansive vision of the BnA Act was a feature of post-confederation pol-
itics. Besides the copyright issue, the government deployed exclusivist theory
in an 1880 dispute with the British over tariff policy.41 Likewise, scholars have
explored its reappearance in the late 1880s and 1890s as the copyright debate
dragged on.42 (it is also worth noting that these examples all involve
Conservative governments, which tended to be more sentimental about the
imperial connection.) But the idea of exclusivity was not limited to politicians.
this section shows that outside of politics this idea was not uncommon or mar-
ginal in the broader legal community in the first two decades of confederation.
that such legal literates took up the exclusivist theory is in fact a very telling
indicator of the degree to which opinions differed over the basic operation of
the constitution and Canada’s place in the empire. 
At least three judges actually applied exclusivist theory in law during this
period. the first and certainly the most important was the 1875 case R. v.
taylor, long noted as an early example of federalism jurisprudence.43 Here,
Chief Justice W.H. Draper of the Ontario Court of Appeal declared that in sec-
tion 91 the word exclusive did not mean that the powers were exclusive of the
provinces, but rather exclusive of the imperial government — that the imperial
government had ended its own authority over those powers.44 Draper had twice
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been co-premier of the province of Canada, and had also served as solicitor
general and attorney general of Upper Canada, and as attorney general after the
union.45 in looking at the federal powers section he concluded that the grant of
exclusivity was “intended as a more definite or extended renunciation on the
part of the parliament of Great Britain of its powers over the internal affairs of
the new Dominion,” than any previous imperial declaration.46 (interestingly,
another judge on that panel was Samuel Henry Strong, later chief justice of the
Supreme Court of Canada, who added briefly that he entirely concurred with
Draper, though he did not write at any length and did not deal with the issue of
exclusivity.47) 
two other known decisions applied this theory, and both came from
Québec courts. the first was an 1881 ruling in Holmes v. temple by sessions
judge Alexandre Chauveau, a prominent lawyer and Queen’s Counsel who had
been a Québec assemblyman and solicitor general of the province and would
later be a professor of law at Laval.48 in this case, Chauveau decided that a
Canadian act passed under the federal power over the military had actually
ended the effect of an imperial army act — that the colonial law had superseded
the imperial.49 the other decision came in the 1883 Vice Admiralty case the
Royal. the judge here was George Okill Stuart, also a Queen’s Counsel, who
had, in addition to being a long-time prominent lawyer, been a solicitor of the
city of Québec, mayor of Québec, and president of the Lower Canada bar.50
this case also involved a kind of competition between provisions of an imper-
ial and a Canadian law. it was a more complex case than Holmes, but in the end
Stuart took a position similar to Chauveau, declaring that Canada’s “exclusive”
power over the subjects listed in section 91 included the power to repeal or
modify imperial laws.51
the argument was also used by lawyers in several other cases, though
unsuccessfully. in the 1876–1877 Ontario copyright case Smiles v. Belford,
defence lawyers, including future toronto mayor and Mp James Beaty, argued
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at trial that an 1875 Canadian copyright act had overridden the imperial law and
that as a result copyright was only available in Canada under the Canadian law
— that imperial copyright had been ended.52 in this, the lawyers argued for the
idea of “exclusive” jurisdiction excluding even imperial power, and cited
Draper’s decision.53 Likewise, in 1879 the lawyer for the College of physicians
and Surgeons of Ontario made a similar argument. the lawyer here was Adam
Crooks, a former Ontario attorney general and provincial treasurer, who was
then sitting as the province’s first minister of education.54
Crooks’ argument was rooted in an idea of colonial liberty. His position
was more complex than the other cases above — he admitted, for example, that
the British parliament could, in theory, amend the BnA Act without Canadian
permission.55 But he took a similar approach to the idea that the act had been a
turning point in the imperial relationship. “no enactment has been passed in
modern times of such gravity as the Constitutional act of 1867,” he contended,
“and it is well known that all its provisions were as carefully discussed and con-
sidered as if it had been a compact between independent nationalities.” He
argued that while it was necessary to package the constitution in an imperial
statute, “it was intended to be lasting and permanent, and therefore only subject
to alteration after the like consideration by the contracting parties.” imperial
laws that infringed on the constitution without such colonial consultation, he
said, “would be an infringement of that liberty of governing ourselves and of
managing our own affairs which was granted to us by the BnA Act.”56 For
Crooks, Canada’s freedom had evolved beyond the imperial system and this
evolution had been ratified by the BnA Act. While theoretical sovereignty still
lingered in Westminster, practical power resided in Canada. 
Outside of the courts, the exclusivist theory was also endorsed in the first
major post-confederation treatise on Canadian constitutional law. A Manual of
Government in Canada was published in 1879 by toronto lawyer Dennis
O’Sullivan, who took a similar approach to Draper and Crooks. He argued that
self-government had gone beyond a political arrangement allowed by imperial
custom, and had become an irrevocable and constitutional principle cemented
by the BnA Act. in so doing, he laid out a very provocative take on the concept
of Canadian sovereignty. He argued that when the empire set up colonial legis-
latures it did more than delegate power, it actually divided sovereignty. in
Canada, he wrote, there was a “three-fold division of sovereignty” between the
imperial, federal, and provincial governments. He called these “separate and
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distinct sovereignties acting separately and independently of each other within
their respective spheres.”57 (Certainly this has implications for federalism gen-
erally, but that is beyond the scope of this paper.) in doing so, he cited and
endorsed Draper’s opinion in taylor. 
O’Sullivan did not deny British authority. that is, he did not think Canada
was altogether independent, and at points it is difficult to piece together how he
squared the idea of divided sovereignties with his admission that the federal
government was “subject to imperial authority.”58 He revisited this issue eight
years later when he published a second edition. in this version, he reversed
some of his arguments about the division of powers made in the first edition —
he went from favouring the federal government to supporting the provinces, for
example.59 But he retained his idea of divided sovereignty, and spelled out
more clearly what London’s lingering power meant, calling it “not much more
than the nominal subjection of a colony to the Mother Country.”60 Moreover,
he went further on the subject of the section 91 powers, writing that on those
issues the imperial parliament had “deprived itself of the right of ever interfer-
ing.”(emphasis added)61 that idea, not just of autonomy but of permanent
abdication of power, speaks to a vision of the BnA Act as much more than an
ordinary imperial statute. For O’Sullivan it was, as he put it, “a contract with
the people.”62 in the first edition he had taken a similar stance, saying that the
federal powers were “introduced by the permission of the people of Canada,
and exist by their own authority, ratified by the Mother Country.”63
O’Sullivan’s ideas on sovereignty are thus similar to those of Crooks. Both
men distinguished between what they regarded as the nominal sovereignty of
Britain and the real power of Canada, which O’Sullivan went so far as to
explicitly call sovereign. theirs was a definition of sovereignty grounded in the
simple question of which government had the final word. in doing so, they both
distinguished between what Britain could and would do — Westminster could
alter the constitution, but it would not, which left Canada in control of domes-
tic issues. Certainly, this was not an orthodox vision, but unorthodox
constitutional ideas flourished in the nineteenth-century empire. As peter C.
Oliver has shown, the empire was a kind of constitutional laboratory in which,
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for example, new zealand gained the power to amend its own constitution as
early as 1852, and proposals for federal governance in Australia and South
Africa, however abortive, circulated for decades.64 Likewise, Lauren Benton’s
work highlights how much of Britain’s practice of imperialism in india was
actually premised on divided sovereignty.65 the influential jurist and colonial
administrator Sir Henry Sumner Maine, for example, noted that the indian
princes exercised some sovereign rights while the imperial government exer-
cised others. “Sovereignty,” he argued in 1864, “has always been regarded as
divisible.”66
in Canada, the argument over constitutional liberty resurfaced in the copy-
right debate in the late 1880s and early 1890s. As scholars have long noted,
Justice Minister (and soon to be prime Minister) Sir John thompson argued
stridently that Canada’s section 91 power on copyright was absolute and that
the federal parliament could in effect repeal imperial law on the subject so far
as it operated in Canada.67 thompson was arguing for a copyright policy which
would have pulled Canada out of the 1886 Berne Convention, and which con-
tained a reprints scheme very similar to that in the 1872 bill. in doing so he
leaned heavily on the theory of exclusivity. “if it were a mere matter of busi-
ness profits i should be inclined to give it up,” he wrote, “but as it is a question
of principle involving the rights of Canada it seems to be a matter of duty to
continue.”68
this is not the place to argue whether thompson or the other proponents
of this theory were right on the law. However, several historians of copyright
have accepted such claims too readily. the by-product of this is to cast
thompson and the Canadians as both legally and morally correct and the impe-
rial authorities who resisted his ideas as reactionary throwbacks pining for a
pre-responsible government empire. Certainly, his rhetoric about Canada’s
rights of self-government was compelling, and the copyright policy for which
he argued might well have been the best for Canada. But these are separate
issues from the constitutional question, and as the following section will show,
thompson was increasingly outside the Canadian legal mainstream in arguing
as he did. 
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The Rejection of the Exclusivist Idea 
this strain of constitutional thought did not win out. Despite Draper’s decision
and O’Sullivan’s treatise, most subsequent judges and constitutional thinkers
rejected the idea that the BnA Act had granted new and sweeping powers.
Likewise, although the federal government embodied the theory in the 1872
copyright bill, and continued on occasion to argue for it into the 1890s and early
1900s, it was decisively rejected by the emerging legal orthodoxy, as noted by
Oliver.69 However, Oliver attributes much of the hardening of ideas on sover-
eignty to the growing influence of the late Victorian British scholar A.V. Dicey.
in fact, there was already considerable intellectual support in Canada and
Britain for what became the orthodox imperial position before Dicey’s ideas
permeated the empire in the late 1880s and 1890s. this section explores the
developing consensus against the theory of exclusivity among imperial offi-
cials, and among Canadian judges and scholars. 
to understand how this legal consensus formed it is necessary to appreci-
ate several aspects of the British parliamentary system and of the imperial
relationship, which challenged the idea that Britain either could renounce or
had renounced its power. At this time, in the British system, simply put, parlia-
ment was supreme and parliament could not bind future parliaments and so
could not renounce permanently their own authority, as advocates of the exclu-
sivist theory seemed to contend Britain had done. Moreover, imperial
sovereignty was actually embedded in the BnA Act, where section 129 kept
pre-confederation laws in force until they were repealed by the federal parlia-
ment or provincial legislatures, while specifically exempting imperial laws
from repeal.70 Also, pre-1867 imperial law continued to apply in Canada: col-
lections in 1874 and 1899 show dozens of imperial laws still operating in the
dominion.71 imperial sovereignty was also evident in the powers of disal-
lowance and reservation still wielded by Britain, which gave the Westminster
government the executive power to block colonial legislation.72 nor were these
dead powers at the time of confederation, either. in fact, in the decade after
1867, at least 12 substantive bills were reserved and reviewed by London, and
at least six of these were blocked by the imperial government.73 Moreover, after
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1867 the imperial parliament continued to legislate for Canada — it continued
to exercise its role as the supreme parliament of the empire. One 1889 book
provides what it says is a partial list of new imperial laws since 1867 and there
are 27 of them. More importantly, around 20 of these new imperial laws were
on subjects given to the federal government in section 91.74 imperial sover-
eignty, then, continued. 
the first systematic response to exclusivist theory came from the British
government after the 1872 copyright bill was passed. After passing through the
Canadian parliament, the bill was reserved by the Governor-General and sent
on to London for review. Because reserved bills expired if they did not get
approval within two years, parliament petitioned the Queen in 1874 to grant the
royal assent.75 this pressure did not succeed in swaying the imperial govern-
ment, and in June 1874 Colonial Secretary Lord Carnarvon announced he was
withholding assent and that the bill would be left to expire. Carnarvon was very
much aware of the wider theory about constitutional power underpinning the
copyright bill, and in his reasons, he noted the assertion in the bill’s preamble
about the Canadian parliament having “express authority” over copyright under
the BnA Act. Carnarvon did not accept that interpretation and brushed it aside,
declaring that section 91 was clearly nothing more than a division of powers
between Ottawa and the provinces. it bestowed power in Canada but could not
be interpreted as limiting Westminster’s authority to legislate for the dominion
as well.76 interestingly, on this point he cited and reproduced an 1871 opinion
written by two eminent British lawyers prepared for the British Copyright
Association, which opposed the Canadian proposals.77
Canadian judges took a similar approach to the constitutional question and
Draper’s decision in taylor quickly fell out of favour. in the Ontario, copyright
case Smiles v. Belford, noted above, both the trial judge and the appeal panel
rejected his interpretation of the BnA Act. this case dealt specifically with
Canada’s copyright power but laid down a doctrine about the dominion’s power
more broadly. At trial in 1876, the judge declared that the BnA Act simply con-
ferred no new authority on copyright.78 in the 1877 appeal court decision,
Justice G.W. Burton was even more strident on this point. Burton began his
decision by declaring that “an erroneous impression would appear to prevail”
about the effect of the BnA Act on copyright, which he blamed on Draper’s
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decision.79 Burton roundly rejected the idea that the BnA Act enlarged
Canada’s power and declared that section 91 only conferred powers exclusive
of the provinces, a point on which the other judges agreed.80 this decision was
followed in 1879 by the College of physicians case where Adam Crooks urged
a variant of this theory. Here again, the court dismissed exclusivist theory.81
these precedents, and not the Draper decision or the two Québec judgments,
became the foundation for later jurisprudence on this point of law.82
However, given the two Québec cases it may be tempting to suppose that
Québec judges were more creative or open to innovations in constitutional the-
ory. While little is known about this aspect of legal thought in Québec,
historians should avoid such generalizations. First, because, as shown below, at
least two prominent Québec legal scholars took a different approach to the con-
stitution. And second, because the former Québec Rouge and anti-Confederate
Antoine-Aimé Dorion joined with most english Canadian judges in rejecting
the idea that the BnA Act had changed the imperial connection. in 1876, while
chief justice of Québec, Dorion heard a case in which lawyers argued that a
post-confederation imperial statute could not apply to Canada because it would
infringe on the dominion’s rights under the BnA Act. Dorion brushed off the
idea, deciding that even if the law were inconsistent with the BnA Act, the out-
come was simple: a newer imperial law trumped an older one.83 in Dorion’s
view, the BnA Act had no special status among imperial laws. His decision on
this point was long used as a precedent alongside Smiles v. Belford and the
College of physicians case.84
A similar consensus formed outside the courts. it is difficult to gauge how
Dennis O’Sullivan’s ideas were received by the legal profession at the time of
publication. During the 1880s, for example, his treatise remained a standard
text for the intermediate examinations at the Law Society of Upper Canada that
law students had to pass before their admission to the bar, so his ideas were, at
least, reaching young lawyers.85 But other evidence suggests his ideas on con-
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stitutional theory met with a critical reception. the Canada Law Journal said
his take on the exclusion of imperial authority in particular was “surprising”
and, generally, that “whether, indeed, the author’s constitutional doctrine is
always sound is questionable.”86 Likewise, in a review of the book’s second
edition, the Canadian Law Times attacked vehemently his argument about
divided sovereignty and in reply stressed Canada’s constitutional subordination
to Westminster. the reviewer wrote that “with respect to the sovereign power
the simplest and most truthful doctrine is that none exists in Canada.” Canada’s
autonomy, he wrote, was simply political and not constitutional in nature.87
Most constitutional scholars after O’Sullivan echoed this idea. While his
book may have been the first major post-confederation constitutional treatise,
within a few years several others had been published and none agreed with him.
the first two were published the year after O’Sullivan’s, in 1880, and were by
librarians: Alpheus todd of the parliamentary library in Ottawa and Samuel
James Watson of the legislative library in toronto. todd, long a respected con-
stitutional thinker and an adviser to several governors-general, was especially
strident on the issue of sovereignty.88 He wrote that the idea of “exclusive”
powers in section 91 must be understood as a division only between Ottawa and
the provinces.89 He called Chief Justice Draper’s opinion in taylor “untenable
and inconsistent with fact,” and he argued that the division of powers section
“has in no respect altered the relation of Canadian subjects to the imperial
Crown or parliament, or interposed any additional obstacle to prevent imperial
legislation in reference to Canada.”90 this was impossible in the British system
of parliamentary sovereignty, he wrote, “for no parliament is competent, by its
own act or declaration, to bind or restrain the freedom of action of a succeed-
ing parliament.”91
todd’s book, like many that followed, was premised on an orderly consti-
tutional system: Westminster remained the supreme parliament of the empire,
and the British government remained the supreme executive and diplomatic
authority. power flowed from it, to be exercised by the colonies, but that exer-
cise did not make them equivalent institutions. Watson, for example, declared: 
political imagination, in its most fervid and patriotic flights, would shrink
from picturing the imperial and the Federal Legislatures as the possessors of
co-equal powers. Still, there may be a few who fancy that the British north
America Act, while giving pre-eminence to the Ottawa House of Commons as
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respects the provincial parliaments, constitutes it, in a mysterious and an
indefinite manner, the compeer of the imperial Legislature. For better or for
worse, they will never be compeers.”92
Most of the other nineteenth century books on the constitution took a similar
view, though with varying degrees of interest in the issue. Montréal lawyer
Joseph Doutre’s 1880 book, for example, did not discuss the issue of imperial
sovereignty at any length, although it did note the copyright controversy and
endorsed Justice Burton’s opinion in Smiles.93 Québec judge t.J.J. Loranger’s
1884 Letters Upon the Interpretation of the Federal Constitution did not deal
with copyright at all, or with Draper’s opinion; but a central plank of his rea-
soning was that sovereignty was indivisible and thus vested in Britain.94
Later scholars of the 1890s and early 1900s, such as A.H.F. Lefroy and
W.H.p. Clement, were more vigorous in arguing for what peter C. Oliver calls
the “imperial orthodoxy” of undivided British sovereignty, heavily influenced
by Dicey and other British thinkers.95 For Lefroy, any vision of the BnA Act
as anything more than an imperial statute allocating powers to still-subordinate
colonial legislatures was fanciful. in fact, one of the central theses of his 
important Law of Legislative Power in Canada was that federal and provincial
legislative power was “conferred subject to the sovereign authority of the
imperial parliament,” a point to which he devoted an entire chapter.96
Conclusion 
in the first few decades of confederation, Canada tested the limits of its power.
Alongside the developing federal-provincial rivalries that would boil over into
decades of controversy and litigation, the federal government also pushed the
bounds of its autonomy within the British empire. the issue of copyright offers
a unique vantage point into this process of legal experimentation. On copyright,
Ottawa took a provocative stance, passing an 1872 bill which was starkly at
odds with the policy of the imperial government. this bill would have overrid-
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den imperial law in Canada, ending the system by which British monopoly
copyright applied everywhere in the empire. in so doing, it challenged imper-
ial law, Britain’s foreign policy, and the powerful London publishing industry.
not surprisingly, then, the bill was blocked by the imperial authorities. 
But this was not simply a debate about copyright. it was also about the
larger question of how the government defined its own power. the 1872 bill,
and others like it in the 1880s and 1890s, was based on an idea of the BnA Act
which would have re-shaped the imperial connection. in this vision of the con-
stitution, the new dominion had gone beyond political autonomy and had
instead obtained sovereignty over the powers given to the federal government
in section 91. this line of thinking gave Canada power even to contravene
imperial law. For proponents of this theory, by allowing Ottawa “exclusive”
control over its list of responsibilities, Westminster had ended its own author-
ity on these issues in Canada. And since copyright was one of those enumerated
powers, it followed that Canada could defy and even override imperial edicts
on the subject. But neither the bill nor the exclusivist theory got very far.
instead, even as Canada’s autonomy within the empire was growing in practice,
a more provocative legal view of Canada’s freedom was decisively beaten
back. 
examined together, these issues illustrate the diversity of opinions sur-
rounding the constitutional order after 1867. Certainly constitutional disputes
were to be expected given the division of powers arrangement where few clear-
cut solutions could be found. However, the debates over Canada’s place in the
empire speak to deeply divergent views of core legal ideas. And that such
debate existed even among those who knew how law worked and understood
constitutional principles, helps us understand the climate of political experi-
mentation and legal self-definition occurring in the post-confederation period.
the new dominion was testing its powers not simply internally, but also in rela-
tion to the very imperial government by which it had been created. 
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